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INTRODUCTION 
The opposing brief to Mrs. Robbins' August 27, cross-
appeal brief was submitted exclusively on behalf of 
Cross-Appellees Old Republic Surety and Northwestern National 
(the "Insurance Company Appellees," "ICA"s or "Bonding 
Companies").1 Yet part of Mrs. Robbins' cross-appeal involves 
Cross-Appellees Check Rite and Atlas. Because Mrs. Robbins1 
cross-appeal is left unopposed by Atlas and Check Rite — parties 
who are in a different position than the ICAs — the lower 
court's summary judgment dismissing Count III as to Atlas and 
Check Rite should be reversed. 
The ICAs mislead the Court in their Statement of Issues. 
Pp. 1-2, ICAs' opposing brief. Specifically, all of the claims 
subject of Mrs. Robbins' cross-appeal do not "sound" in contract. 
Counts III and V are grounded in tort. Only Count IV is grounded 
in contract. Further, contrary to the ICAs' assertions, the 
trial court never did "find" that Mrs. Robbins lacked privity of 
contract with the ICAs and that, as a result, Counts III, IV, and 
V are fatally defective.2 
The ICAs state that Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is determinative of Mrs. Robbins' cross-appeal. P. 3, 
1
 In the record below, the ICAs were referred to by Mrs. Robbins as the ICDs or 
Insurance Company Defendants. 
2
 The same criticism is applicable to issue numbers one and three on pages 1 
and 2, respectively, of the ICAs' opposing brief. In other words, contrary to the assertions 
in the ICAs' Statement of Issues, the lower court never "found" anything to be the case. 
opposing brief. On the contrary, while the lower court 
technically handled the motion as one for summary judgment, it 
erroneously invoked Rule 12(b)(6) standards. See pp. 11-12 and 
footnote 5, Mrs. Robbins' August 27, supporting brief. 
Nonetheless, the lower court further erred in stating no basis 
for its cursory dismissal of Counts III, IV, and V under Rule 56. 
New West Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guardian Title 
Company of Utah, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 41, note 2, P.2d 
(Utah App. September 23, 1991 ). 3 
Mrs. Robbins has no dispute with the ICAs• Statement of 
the Case (pp. 3-7, opposing brief) other than what is 
conspicuously absent therefrom.4 Cf. Mrs. Robbins1 Relevant 
Facts, pp. 3-11, supporting brief. While the record is clear 
that the lower court stated no ground for its dismissal of Counts 
III through V, there was also no ruling that Mrs. Robbins had 
3
 Therein the Court of Appeals recently stated: 
Our dilemma in this case is that the [lower] court relied generally 
on America's memorandum in support of summary judgment and 
did not "issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision," as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). This leaves us in a 
position of guessing which of the fifteen different legal theories 
in the memorandum were accepted by the [lower] court. 
The same can be said of how the lower court granted the ICAs1 motion for 
summary judgment below. 
4
 There is but one exception. Contrary to the ICAs1 assertions therein, the 
record is clear that Mrs. Robbins did not "notify Old Republic's local Salt Lake City branch 
office on May 20, 1988, of her potential claim." Rather, she notified them earlier. In the 
record below, Old Republic merely acknowledged that it was aware of her claim on or 
before May 20, 1988. See 116, p.5, Mrs. Robbins' supporting brief. 
completed discovery relative to such claims or that the Rule 
56(f) affidavit of her counsel was insufficient to postpone 
summary judgment. See Exhibits "C" and "F," Mrs. Robbins' 
supporting brief and Exhibits to Mrs. Robbins' Docketing 
Statement. 
SUMMARY OF COUNTER-ARGUMENT 
In the ICAs1 Summary of Argument, pp. 7-9 opposing 
brief, the ICAs argue that Mrs. Robbins' Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Claims for Relief "sound in contract." This is not true. Only 
Claim for Relief IV, alleging breach of an implied third party 
beneficiary contract, "sounds" in contract. While Mrs. Robbins 
was not in privity with the ICAs at the time the bond was 
procured by Defendant Fletcher, her direct dealings with 
Mr. Guardalabene (Old Republic) created a privity 
relationship.5 Furthermore, even if such direct dealings did not 
create either a privity or fiduciary relationship, Atlas, having 
directed Mrs. Robbins to the ICAs, effected an assignment of its 
right as obligee on the bond to her. Consequently, and by virtue 
of Atlas's undisputed conduct, Mrs. Robbins became a beneficiary 
under the open penalty indemnity bond,6 
5
 If not, these dealings, at a minimum, certainly created a fiduciary relationship 
between Old Republic and Mrs. Robbins. 
6
 While there is little in the record from Cross-Appellees on this score, no 
doubt Guardalabene dealt directly with Mrs. Robbins because he had discussed the matter 
with Atlas and/or Check Rite and he was given permission and/or authority to deal with 
Mrs. Robbins directly. On the contrary, if Old Republic did such on its own, such only 
bolsters Mrs. Robbins* argument that, at a minimum, a fiduciary relationship was created. 
See Conclusion below. 
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The ICAs further submit that a claim for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "sounds" solely 
in contract. P. 7, first sentence of Summary of Argument, 
opposing brief. This is not the law. In fact, since Beck, 
Justices Zimmerman and Durham have stated that punitive damages 
may be awarded when one prevails on such claim "and all of the 
elements of a separate tort exist." Gagon v. State Farm Mutual 
Auto Insurance Company, 92 Ut. Adv. Rep. 21, 771 P.2d 325 (Utah 
1988).7 If a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is always contractual in nature, there 
would never be a legal basis to award punitive damages for the 
breach or violation thereof. Id. 
The ICAs or Bonding Companies further contend that 
Mrs. Robbins' "position" is that she would only be in 
"contractual privity" with them if she was "a third-party 
beneficiary to the bond." P. 8, 1st full i , opposing brief. 
This argument begs the very question of privity and it has never 
been asserted by Mrs. Robbins. 
7
 In Gagon, 92 Utah Adv. Rep. at p. 21, Justice Zimmerman reiterated that, 
when the alleged breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves the 
insurer and the insured, the claim giving rise to such a cause of action lies in contract. As 
previously stated, in this case, Mrs. Robbins was not the insured. Thus, the ICAs' opposing 
brief assumes a false premise from start to finish. 
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COUNTERPOINT I 
THE ICAS ARGUE THAT MRS. ROBBINS IS NOT A THIRD-PARTY 
BENEFICIARY TO THE BOND. YET EVEN IF THEY ARE CORRECT (WHICH 
THEY AREN'T), THIS WOULD ONLY MEAN THAT COUNT IV MIGHT FAIL, NOT 
COUNTS III OR V. 
The ICAs or Bonding Companies argue that Claims for 
Relief III, IV, and V were properly dismissed solely because of a 
lack of privity between them and Mrs. Robbins. Pp. 7-9, opposing 
brief. Again, this is not the law. The law is succinctly set 
forth in Culp Construction Company v. Buildmart Mall, 137 
Ut. Adv. Rep. 4, 795 P.2d 650 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1990). Therein, 
this Court stated: 
. . . our holding in Beck does not 
preclude the bringing of a tort claim 
independently of a contract claim . . . . 
Furthermore, "privity of contract is not a 
necessary prerequisite to liability." 
137 Utah Adv. Rep. at p. 6, notes 9 and 12. What is remarkable 
is that while Culp Construction is dispositive of this appeal in 
Mrs. Robbins' favor and while it was cited repeatedly in 
Mrs. Robbins1 supporting brief, the same is conspicuously ignored 
by the ICAs. Further, rather than either cite or distinguish 
Culp Construction, the ICAs rely exclusively on Pixton v. State 
Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 809 
P.2d 746 (Utah App. 1991), a recent Court of Appeals decision 
which eviscerates Beck and Gagon and which fails to distinguish 
Culp. 
-5-
The ICAs further rely on an illustration from Corbin On 
Contracts. Pp. 11-12, opposing brief. This analogy, like many 
analogies, is inapposite. For instance, the Corbin analogy 
involves the mere payment of money, not the replacement of 
specific stock subject of a bond; it also does not involve a 
situation where those like Atlas and Check Rite are totally under 
the thumb of an insurance company and, as a result, could not 
settle with the third party even if they had wanted 
to.8 Further, Mrs. Robbins is not in the same position as the 
homeowner in Schwinghammer v. Alexander, 21 Utah 2d 418, 446 P.2d 
414 (Utah 1968). Schwinghammer is distinguishable in that the 
homeowner there was neither a donee nor a creditor 
beneficiary.^ Mrs. Robbins, on the other hand, is the 
beneficiary of a bond that was posted to protect her (the public) 
in the event that Certificate No. 258 resurfaced. In 
Schwinghammer, it was certainly not intended that the house would 
not be built and, as a result, a third-party claim on an escrow 
agreement — which is not a bond — was either foreseeable or 
necessary. Schwinghammer does not involve a situation where a 
8
 In other words, if Atlas and Check Rite had settled directly with Mrs. Robbins, 
they risked compromising their own crossclaims against the ICAs. Neither desirous of nor 
being able to afford protracted litigation with the ICAs, Atlas and Check Rite thus had little 
choice but to do what the ICAs wanted. 
9
 One might also argue that based on Atlas's "bowing-out" and instructing 
Mrs. Robbins to deal directly with the ICAs constitutes an assignment which renders 
Mrs. Robbins at least a "donee beneficiary" under the bond. 
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house would not be built (or was lost) and an escrow agreement 
was subsequently entered into in order to furnish the buyer 
thereof with a "replacement" house. 
The ICAs cite Fleck v. National Property Management, 
Inc., 590 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1979), for the proposition that because 
Mrs. Robbins was not expressly named in the bond, she cannot 
recover. Mrs. Robbins submits that the language of the bond 
overrides this general statement of the law in that, under the 
express terms of the bond, the ICAs agreed to incur "absolute 
liability." See p. 13, Mrs. Robbins' supporting brief. Saying 
it another way, Mrs. Robbins' right to pursue the ICAs is 
governed by insurance law, not the law of suretyship. See Vance 
on Insurance, Ch. 2, §10, "What Is A Contract Of Insurance?: 
Guaranty, Fidelity, and Surety Bonds," Hornbook Series, West 
Publishing Co., pp. 84-85. In short, the ICAs are not gratuitous 
sureties as they might have this Court believe. As a result, 
their liability extends beyond the strict letter of the 
agreement. ld_. at p. 85; see also General Electric Credit 
v. Wolverine Insurance Co., 120 Mich. App. 227, 327 N.W.2d 449, 
451-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 362 N.W.2d 595 
- 7 -
(Sup. Ct. Mich. 1984) .10 
COUNTERPOINT II 
PRIVITY OF CONTRACT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO A CLAIM OF 
INSURER BAD FAITH OR FOR BREACH OF AN IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
The ICAs misconstrue what this Court has held relative 
to maintaining a claim of either insurer bad faith or breach of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This Court 
has never stated that such a claim only lies in contract. On the 
contrary, Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985), unequivocally holds that in a third-party situation, the 
obligations of the insurer would have to be fiduciary, thereby 
giving rise to a tort cause of action. This is confirmed in 
Gagon and Gulp Construction. The ICAs entice this Court into 
inconsistency by relying on Pixton, a recent Court of Appeals 
decision which, as aforesaid, wholly ignores Culp and misreads 
Beck. As opposed to Pixton, Mrs. Robbins is not cLaiming that 
the ICAs, like State Farm in Pixton, merely bungled the handling 
1 0
 Therein the court held that where a surety for hire gives a bond to afford 
protection to the general public, if its terms so permit, the bond should be construed so as 
to accomplish that purpose. Id. at p. 451. The court further stated that if a bond is 
susceptible to construction, one favorable to the insured and one favorable to the insurer, 
that construction will be adopted which favors liability of the insurer for the act or default 
in question. Id. at p. 452. In addition, assuming the law of suretyship applies to this case, 
Mrs. Robbins is unaware of anything under such law which would prevent her from 
maintaining an action against the Bonding Companies. On the other hand, suretyship law 
would not appear to apply to this case inasmuch as the Bonding Companies would not be 
considered "guarantors" of Atlas and Check Rite's non-monetary obligation(s) to 
Mrs. Robbins. See Utah Code Ann. §70A-1-201(40). 
of her claim. This case goes far beyond that, approaching both 
fraud and misrepresentation. Simply put, the facts of Pixton, 
even if adopted by this Court on its own facts, are inapplicable 
to this case. 
Since privity of contract is not essential to 
maintaining a claim of insurer of bad faith or breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the ICAs' 
opposing brief makes no sense. 
The ICAs proceed to argue that the doctrine of estoppel 
is inapplicable. On p. 17, opposing brief, they state: 
Plaintiff did not forego any right which might 
have otherwise existed by relying on the 
Bonding Companies' conduct. 
This again is not true. Based on the representations of 
Guardalabene, the ICAs' agent and employee, Mrs. Robbins did 
indeed forego rights and remedies which she might have otherwise 
exercised immediately. For instance, Mrs. Robbins could have 
immediately brought suit and forced delivery of her stock at a 
preliminary injunction hearing, something she was told or 
reasonably assumed was completely unnecessary. Unfortunately, 
when she finally knew otherwise, it was too late: the stock had 
become virtually worthless. Thus, privity, while only relevant 
to Count IV, was in fact created by conduct. Accordingly, by 
virtue of Mrs. Robbins' detrimental reliance, the ICAs are 
estopped from denying liability. 
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COUNTERPOINT III 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ICAs OR BONDING COMPANIES 
DID OWE MRS. ROBBINS A DUTY TO DEAL FAIRLY AND HONESTLY WITH HER, 
A DUTY THEY KNOWINGLY BREACHED. FURTHERMORE, WHATEVER DUTY 
AROSE, IT IS A DUTY SUFFICIENT FOR MRS. ROBBINS TO STATE A TORT 
CLAIM. 
The ICAs further argue that they owed no duty and 
assumed no duty of care to Mrs. Robbins.11 Pp. 18-20, opposing 
brief. While this "sounds" in negligence, the lower court has 
never dismissed Mrs. Robbins1 separate negligence claim below, 
Count VII, amended complaint. At the same time, if the ICAs 
neither owed nor assumed a duty of any kind to Mrs. Robbins, why 
did they try to settle with her directly, let alone talk to her 
repeatedly and for several months. Are they merely officious 
intermeddlers? Furthermore, if a duty arose by virtue of the 
ICAs' conduct, the existence of such — or even the consequences 
thereof — should be put to a jury: it should not be disposed of 
upon a motion.1^ 
1 1
 Mrs. Robbins wonders why an argument along these lines has been posed by 
the ICAs. A "special duty" relates to negligence, not a fiduciary duty. A fiduciary duty is 
based on a relationship of trust, confidence and the ability to overbear — a relationship 
that Guardalabene had — or was able to garner — with Mrs. Robbins before the stock 
dropped and before, for want of a better phrase, he "lowered the boom," informing her he 
could no longer help her and that she should go consult a lawyer. 
1 2
 The lower court's summary judgment does not meet the standards 
enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1986 trilogy of cases encouraging resolution by 
summary judgment. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 106 
S.Ct. 1348 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). That is to say, a reasonable juror could conceivably 
conclude differently than the lower court in this case (especially when we don't know why 
the lower court ruled as it did). Id. 
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The ICAs repeat the assertion that for a duty to exist 
under tort law, Mrs. Robbins is obligated to prove that a 
"special relationship" existed between her and the Bonding 
Companies.13 P. 18, opposing brief. Again, this is not the law. 
In a tort context, Beck only requires a "fiduciary relationship." 
Because no trial was had below, Mrs. Robbins has been deprived of 
establishing the requisite "duty." At the same time, a "special 
relationship" did exist as a matter of law because the ICAs 
negotiated directly with Mrs. Robbins in order to settle her 
claim. Such a relationship under the facts set forth in Mrs. 
Robbins1 affidavits is indeed "fiduciary," let alone "special," 
particularly when Old Republic had the ability to overbear and 
when the insured (Atlas) had deliberately "bowed-out" of the 
equation. 
The ICAs1 singular reliance on Beach v. The University 
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986), a negligence case, is 
misplaced. Were the issue in Counts III, IV, and V one of 
negligence, then Beach — which goes beyond Beck — might have 
some bearing. Thus, while the ICAs argue that Mrs. Robbins has 
never alleged a "special relationship" between her and them, 
pleading is not the issue. On the contrary, the nature of the 
"relationship" is a jury issue and only underscores why the 
summary judgment dismissing Counts III-V should be reversed. 
13
 It is not clear whether the ICAs are talking of mere negligence or whatever 
duty is apparently necessary to give rise to a tort claim as contemplated in Culp and Beck. 
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Prior to their Conclusion, the ICAs argue that 
"Plaintiff sustained no damage as a result of the conduct of the 
Bonding Companies." Once again, this is false. Had the ICAs or 
Bonding Companies done what they were supposed to have done as 
fiduciaries, Mrs. Robbins would have had eight thousand (8,000) 
shares of Check Rite stock to sell at July end/August beginning 
1988 and this lawsuit would not exist. Certainly this is damage, 
particularly when there is no guarantee that this Court will not, 
for some unknown reason, reverse the summary judgment as to 
Counts I and II (i.e., the separate appeal of appellants/ 
defendants).14 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents a tremendous opportunity for this 
Court to clarify Beck and Culp Construction and eliminate the 
error and confusion certain to occur as a result of the Court of 
Appeals' Pixton decision. Culp and Beck are dispositive of Mrs. 
Robbins1 Cross-Appeal. If she is not a creditor or donee 
beneficiary under the bond -- a bond which provides for "absolute 
liability" — then the lower court only properly dismissed Claim 
for Relief IV. Counts III and V lie in tort under Culp, Beck, 
and Gagon. On the other hand, if this Court determines that 
Mrs. Robbins did have some kind of privity relationship with the 
1 4
 If this were to occur, the supersedeas bond presently in place would no 
doubt be released and, for all Mrs. Robbins knows, Check Rite and Atlas might soon 
thereafter go out-of-business. 
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ICAs as a result of their conduct or otherwise, then Claims for 
Relief III and V would naturally lie in contract under Beck, 
Culp, Gagon, or even the Court of Appeals' Pixton decision.15 
The lower court failed to issue a statement for the 
basis of its dismissal of Claims for Relief III, IV, and V and 
therefore, it further erred under the dictum articulated in New 
West Federal Savings & Loan supra.16 
Based on the foregoing, more especially Mrs. Robbins• 
supporting brief, the lower court's summary dismissal of Counts 
III, IV, and V is a miscarriage of justice and it should be 
reversed. / 
DATED this (ti I day of Nov, 
fOHK' MICHAEL COOMBS 
attorney for Cross-Appellant/ 
appellee/Plaintiff LeAnna 
(Broadwater) Robbins 
! 5 See also St. Benedict Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 11. 
13-14, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah Sup. Ct. 1991). 
! 6 The Court should also note that the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis has replaced 
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno. Thus, if this case were sent back so that the lower court 
could "issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision," Judge Lewis might 
view the matter quite differently. 
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Surety and Northwestern National 
Insurance Company of Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor, Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Larry G. Reed, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Atlas 
CROWTHER & REED 
445 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phillip R. Hughes, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Check Rite 
884 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
0200.01:RBRIEF.1-7(F00T.4) 
